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TORT LAW-Duty as a Matter of Policy:
Solon v. WEK Drilling
I. INTRODUCTION
In Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., Inc.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
once again visited the issue of the relationship between duty and foreseeability in negligence actions. The court's decision is the latest in a
string of three cases 2 establishing New Mexico's position on Palsgraf
questions. These cases document the emergence of the view that the
determination of whether a duty exists in a negligence action is governed
by policy considerations. Chief Justice Ransom and Justices Baca and
Montgomery have expressed differing opinions regarding the role of policy,
but all agree that policy is a factor that may limit liability, even when
an injury is foreseeable. This Note evaluates the evolving policy standard
for duty analysis in New Mexico and the competing views regarding duty.
The Note concludes with a discussion of the existing views of the role
of policy in duty analysis and how this analysis might develop in the
future.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ivan Ponce, the 25-year-old son of Alvino and Maria Ponce ("the
Ponces"), was employed by an independent contractor working in and
around a drilling rig owned and operated by WEK Drilling Co., Inc.,
("WEK Drilling"). The court assumed that "Ivan was killed as a proximate result of WEK Drilling's negligence in failing . . .to maintain [and

operate the rig safely]." Arthur Solon, as personal representative of the
estate of Ivan and on behalf of Ivan's daughter, Ambrosia, brought a
wrongful death action against WEK Drilling for damages suffered due
to Ivan's death. The Ponces sought to intervene in this suit, claiming
they suffered damages including: "loss of financial support provided by
their son; loss of consortium with their son, including loss of society,
4
companionship, and affection; and grief, sorrow, and bereavement."
At the time of his death, Ivan was living with his parents. According
to the Ponces' depositions, Ivan enjoyed a loving relationship with both
his parents and provided them with financial assistance by performing
various work projects around the Ponce home. Ivan had been divorced,
and Ambrosia was his only child.5

1. 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992).
2. Id.; Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100
N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
3. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). In Palsgraf, Judge Cardozo
stated that a duty is not owed if the plaintiff is not found to be foreseeable or within the zone
of danger.
4. Solon, 113 N.M. at 567, 829 P.2d at 646.
5..Id.
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The court dismissed the loss of consortium claim, citing several New6
Mexico cases rejecting loss of consortium as a valid cause of action.
The court also held that the Ponces could not bring a cause of action
under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act, 7 as they were not the personal
representatives of their son's estate. The court considered whether the
Ponces could not intervene, based on whether their complaint stated a
cause of action upon which relief could be granted.8 In determining
whether the Ponces would be permitted to intervene under Rule 24(B),
the court addressed the question of duty and the role of foreseeability
and policy in negligence claims. 9
III. AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT DUTY ANALYSIS
The principle duty analysis case in tort jurisprudence is Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad.'0 Then-Judge Cardozo, serving on the New York
Court of Appeals, established the standard for duty analysis which has
been universally embraced by state courts all over the country." In
Palsgraf, a man being assisted by railroad employees dropped a bag of
fireworks he was carrying, and they exploded. 12 Mrs. Helen Palsgraf was
standing nearby and was struck by a scale that fell as the result of the
explosion. 3 In deciding whether the railroad was liable to Mrs. Palsgraf,
the court addressed the issue of whether the railroad owed a duty to
her. Judge Cardozo, writing the majority opinion, held that Helen Palsgraf's injuries were not foreseeable to the railroad employees when they
acted to assist the passenger on the train. 4 Hence, the court found that
the defendant owed Mrs. Palsgraf no duty.' 5
Plainly stated, Palsgrafresolved the issue of to whom a duty is owed.
The court held that a duty is owed only to individuals whom the defendant

6. Id. at 571, 829 P.2d at 650 (citing Tondre v. Thurmond-Hollis-Thurmond, Inc., 103 N.M.
292, 293, 706 P.2d 156, 157 (1985); Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 218, 387 P.2d 321,
328 (1963); Wilson v. Wylie, 86 N.M. 9, 16, 518 P.2d 1213, 1220 (Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied,
86 N.M. 5, 518 P.2d 1209 (1974)).
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2-1 to -3 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
8. The court addressed the issue of permissive intervention under N.M. R. Cv. P. 1-024(B).
In order for the court to allow permissive intervention the court would have to find that the
"Ponces' proposed complaint in intervention stat[ed] a legally sufficient common law claim, independent of the wrongful death act, for the economic loss . . . they suffered from the death of
their son, which was caused by the negligence of defendant WEK Drilling." Solon, 113 N.M. at
569, 829 P.2d at 648.
9. Id. at 569-72, 829 P.2d at 648-51.
10. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
11. [A]ctor is liable if actor's conduct is negligent with respect to plaintiff or
class of persons within which he is included; fact that actor's conduct causes
harm to person whom actor could not reasonably have anticipated injury
does not make actor liable to person so injured . .. [Pirevailing view is that
obligation to refrain from negligent conduct is owed only to those who are
foreseeably endangered by the conduct.
Solon, 113 N.M. at 570, 829 P.2d at 649 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b)
& cmt. c (1965); and FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2, at 655 (2d
ed. 1986)).
12. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 101.
15. Id.
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reasonably could foresee would be harmed by the defendant's conduct. 6
Cardozo's formulation has often been questioned. In Palsgraf, Judge
Andrews dissented, stating that "[e]very one owes to the world at large
the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten
the safety of others.' '1 7 Judge Andrews stated that a duty could be owed
even if the plaintiff was outside the zone of foreseeable danger. 8 Dean
Prosser questioned Cardozo's strict foreseeability analysis by stating that
liability should be a problem governed by the social policy of "where
to draw the line against otherwise unlimited liability."' 9 Taken together,
Dean Prosser and Judge Andrews' views represent the prevalent opposition
to the Cardozo standard for duty analysis.
New Mexico case law on the Palsgraf question is limited to several
recent cases which directly address the relationship between duty and
foreseeability. 20 The principle question in New Mexico revolves around
how a court is to define this relationship. The prevalent view, as expressed
in New Mexico opinions on duty analysis, is that duty is determined by
considering foreseeability along with policy and that even if foreseeability
is present, policy may negate duty. If a difference in these views is to
be found, it is likely to be in the articulation of the policy analysis.
Each statement of the policy standard is phrased differently. The subtle
differences between these definitions raise the question of whether significant differences truly exist and, if so, which analysis provides the
clearest definition of what policies should be used.
IV.

POLICY IN NEW MEXICO DUTY ANALYSIS

A.

Ramirez: The Seminal Case
The elements of duty in New Mexico were first considered in Ramirez
v. Armstrong.2 ' In Ramirez, the plaintiffs brought suit for damages
resulting from the negligent infliction of emotional distress suffered when
they witnessed or were told of the death of their father. 22 The court,
noting the Palsgraf standard for duty analysis, stated that "[ijf it is
found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then
a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant. ' 23 This quotation,
standing alone, suggests that the sole test of duty is foreseeability. However, the court qualified this simple test by referring to Dean Prosser's

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Solon, 113 N.M. at 569, 829 P.2d at 648 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 287 (5th ed. 1984)).
20. For the purposes of clarity, this note will focus on Solon, on Calkins v. Cox Estates,
110 N.M. 59 (1990), and on Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 614 (1991), also raised a question
concerning foreseeability but did not provide a clear Palsgraf question.
21. 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
22. Id. at 539, 673 P.2d at 823.
23. Id. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825.
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definition of duty, 24 which provides that analysis of the interest sought
"establishes the legally recognized obligation of [a] deto be protected
25
fendant."
In Ramirez, the court held that the interest to be protected, that of
the prevention of the infliction of emotional distress, was an interest
protected and recognized by New Mexico law. The court, utilizing existing
27
New Mexico case law, held that a duty was owed to the plaintiffs.
Hence, it was unnecessary for the court to decide how duty is to be
determined absent existing precedent identifying plaintiffs' interest as one
to be protected.
Ramirez teaches that duty analysis involves the consideration of both
the presence of foreseeability and an analysis of policy protecting the
interest invaded by a defendant's conduct. The relevant policy consideration is based upon existing common and statutory law regarding the
complained-of conduct. Because, in Ramirez, Justice Federici did not
find foreseeability and policy in conflict, he did not have occasion to
28
assess the relative weight to be given to each in the duty analysis.
Hence, Ramirez does not decide whether absence of foreseeability would
be determinative, nor does it demonstrate the means of analysis where
foreseeability is present, but policy reasons exist not to impose a duty.
Justice Baca in Calkins: Policy is Governed by Existing Legal
Precedent, Statutes and Other Principles
Though an analysis of how duty is to be determined was begun in
Ramirez, the principal case in New Mexico defining duty is Calkins v.
Cox Estates.29 In Calkins, the plaintiff, as personal representative of the
estate of Daniel Enriquez, brought a wrongful death action against Enriquez's landlord, claiming that eight-year-old Daniel died due to the
landlord's negligence. 0 Enriquez died after he wandered through a hole
in the fence surrounding his apartment playground, crossed an arroyo
and walked to Interstate 25 which was 945 feet away. He was then struck
and killed by an automobile." The plaintiff alleged negligence by the
32
landlord based on the landlord's failure to secure the playground area.
The district court and the court of appeals both found that the landlord
33 The supreme
did not owe a duty to the child to secure the playground.
4
court granted certiorari on the question of duty.
B.

24. Id. (citing WLtmm L. PROSSER, TiE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971)). Dean
Prosser, suggesting that there is nothing "sacred" about duty, proposes that the duty of a
defendant must be an obligation that the law recognizes.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26.
28. Id. The court held both that the plaintiffs were foreseeable and that existing law
recognized the interest they sought to be protected.
29. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990).
30. Id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Justice Baca, writing the majority opinion in which then-Chief Justice
Sosa and Justices Montgomery and Wilson concurred, remanded on the
question of whether a duty was, indeed, owed to the plaintiff.3 5 The
court declared that, before finding a duty, a court must "determine that
the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff-that he was within the zone
of danger created by [defendant's] actions." 3 6 Justice Baca, applying
language from Ramirez, wrote that "[i]f it is found that a plaintiff, and
injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that
plaintiff by the defendant. ' " 7 Justice Baca, however, did not limit the
duty analysis to foreseeability alone.
In support of his holding finding a duty, Justice Baca ruled that duty
is a matter of law and that the existence of a duty is a question of
policy that can be determined by "legal precedent, statutes, and other
principles comprising the law." 3 8 Like Justice Federici in Ramirez, Justice
Baca in Calkins deferred to existing New Mexico case and statutory law
in his policy analysis. Justice Baca looked to existing law regarding the
relationship between landlord and tenant when he determined that, as a
matter of law, the landlord owed a duty to the child.3 9 Justice Baca
stated that the "difficult question, whether respondent had a duty toward
reference to our statutes and wellthe young child, can be answered with
' )
established common law traditions. 4
Because there was existing law imposing duties in the landlord-tenant
relationship, it was once again unnecessary to identify the seminal policies
which might further define a legal duty in negligence actions. The ambiguity of Justice Baca's analysis arises when the relationship between
plaintiff and defendant is not governed by an existing law such as that
between landlord and tenant. If duty is a question of law, the judge
must resolve any policy questions surrounding duty. The standard for
such judicial discretion is unclear. Justice Baca stated that "legal precedent, statutes and other principles comprising the law ' 41 would govern
the decision but did not offer examples of what "other principles" might
be. If duty can be found based upon "other principles comprising the
law," it is important that some method by which one can determine
those principles be provided.
Justice Baca failed to state what evidence in support of or contrary
to "other principles comprising the law" would be allowed. 42 He stated

35. Id. at 66, 792 P.2d at 43. In holding that there was a duty, Justice Baca distinguished
the elements of duty and proximate cause, explaining the role of foreseeability in duty and
proximate cause. The court further distinguished the two elements of negligence by stating
that foreseeability regarding duty "must be decided as a matter of law by a judge, using
established legal policy .... ," and that, as an element of proximate cause, foreseeability is
a question of fact. Id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 62.
38. Id.
39. Id.at 63-65, 792 P.2d at 40-43.
40. Id. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
41. Id.
42. In a footnote to his opinion, Justice Baca alluded to an expert witness's affidavit
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the significance of policy more clearly than did Justice Federici in Ramirez

when he wrote:
In the case presented to us today, it is not necessary for us to balance
the policy interests to determine whether defendant owed plaintiff a
duty. References to our statutes and common law establishes that43
plaintiff was owed a duty based on the landlord-tenant relationship.
Hence, for Justice Baca, if a clear policy standard exists, policy may be
the determinative factor in deciding whether a duty was owed. The
principal teaching of Calkins is that foreseeability is a factor, but not
the determinative factor, in duty analysis. Furthermore, Calkins suggests

that a court could find a duty absent foreseeability, since, as Justice
Baca held, "the existence of a duty is a question of policy. ' ""
Justice Montgomery in Solon: The Interest to be Protected
Governs the Policy
Justice Montgomery, who concurred in the majority opinion in Calkins,
wrote for the majority in Solon v. WEK Drilling Co. Inc.45 Justice
Montgomery identified Solon as questioning the relationship between duty
and foreseeability and, therefore, as a Palsgraf case.46 Before stating
whether a duty existed, Justice Montgomery took note of Dean Prosser's
view of the duty analysis, acknowledging that determining the existence
of a duty implicates the question of "where to draw the line against
otherwise unlimited liability." 47 Nevertheless, Justice Montgomery stated
C.

that:
[The court is not] writing on a clean slate, and we do not perceive
this case to be a good one in which to reexamine the social policy
plaintiff and
that limits a tortfeasor's liability to the foreseeable
48
excludes it where the plaintiff is unforeseeable.
Justice Montgomery signalled his willingness to accept the well-established
principle in New Mexico that foreseeability of harm is a prerequisite to
the creation of a duty. 49 He was hesitant to adopt the view that social
policy is solely determinative of duty. This decision was made easy since

offered by the petitioner in support of a finding of foreseeability and duty. According to
Justice Baca, the affidavit was useful in the proximate cause analysis but did not state whether
it should be considered in the duty analysis. Id. at 65 n.6, 792 P.2d at 41. Nevertheless, it
seems this type of evidence might be the factual basis by which a judge could determine the
policy that lay behind Justice Baca's "other principles of law." Still, Justice Baca maintains
that policy regarding the duty element is not a factual determination and that factual
determinati6ns should be left to the proximate cause analysis. Hence, Justice Baca may leave
consideration of foreseeability to his analysis of proximate cause.
43. Id. at 63, 792 P.2d at 40.
44. Id. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
45. 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992).
46. Id. Justice Montgomery begins his opinion by stating that Solon is "a Palsgraf case
(though not a particularly good one)." Id. at 566, 829 P.2d at 645 (footnote omitted).

47. Id. at 569, 829 P.2d at 648 (citing W. PAGE
§ 43, at 287 (5th ed. 1984)).

ON THE LAW OF TORTS

48. Id. at 569-70, 829 P.2d at 648-49.
49. Id. at 571, 829 P.2d at 650.

KEETON ET AL.,

PROSSER AND KEETON
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he held that, as a matter of law, the Ponces' interests were unforeseeable
to the defendant, WEK Drilling.50 Justice Montgomery reasoned that
while it was foreseeable that Ivan might have living parents, it was not
foreseeable that such parents might sustain injury as a result of his
death. 5
Justice Montgomery's duty analysis, however, was not based solely
upon foreseeability. He wrote that "the social policy of cutting off the
liability that would otherwise extend to these family members seems
sound, at least in a case in which they allege no more palpable injury
than that claimed here. ' 5 2 Justice Montgomery held that as a matter of
law the Ponces' interests were unforeseeable, yet he felt compelled to
add that social policy considerations were consistent with the no-dutybecause-no-foreseeability holding.
Justice Montgomery explained that the Ramirez court expanded the
Palsgrafstandard to include Prosser's suggestion that "the foreseeability
of harm to the plaintiff should be but one factor in determining the
existence of a duty, and not always conclusive, and that situations will
more or less inevitably arise which do not fit within any fixed and
inflexible rule." 53 The added factor in Ramirez, which was adopted by
the Calkins court and then by the court in Solon, is that of policy
considerations. Justice Montgomery suggested that even if the Ponces
54
were foreseeable plaintiffs, social policy mandates a finding of no duty.
Hence, he interpreted'the majority opinion in Calkins to require that
foreseeability is a precondition to a finding of duty, but is not determinative of duty. The presence of a countervailing social policy could
outweigh the finding of foreseeability. While Justice Montgomery acknowledged the limitations social policy places on determining duty, he
stopped short of finding that policy alone could create a duty in the
absence of foreseeability. According to him, the role of policy is to limit
duty when foreseeability is present and not to extend duty when foreseeability is absent.
Justice Montgomery's view is consistent with Justice Baca's view that,
in addition to finding that a plaintiff was foreseeable, the court must
find, as a matter of law, that a duty to that plaintiff should be extended
based on policy considerations. Justice Baca's and Justice Montgomery's
views differ, however, because where Justice Baca's policy analysis is
governed by legal precedent, statutes, and other principles comprising the
law, Justice Montgomery's definition
of policy more broadly encompasses
' 55
what he calls "social policy.
Justice Montgomery failed to define precisely what he meant by the
term "social policy". He did not assign the same role to policy consid-

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 570, 829 P.2d at 649 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 288 (5th ed. 1984)).
54. Id. at 571, 829 P.2d at 650.
55. Id.
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erations as did Justice Baca. Nevertheless, language in Solon hints at
possible considerations behind Justice Montgomery's "social policy" analysis. After acknowledging that foreseeability may not be the sole factor
in duty analysis, Justice Montgomery evaluated the Ponces' claim to
determine whether there was an invasion of an interest that the law
would protect. This analysis is in concert with that of Ramirez. The
Ramirez court held that duty is "an obligation to which the law will
give recognition and effect ' 56 and that the "interest establishes the legally
recognized obligation. ' ' 57 Hence, the standard for Justice Montgomery's
social policy, the consideration of the interest to be protected, seems to
be the same as the Ramirez standard."
When determining if an interest is to be protected, the court must
look to existing law and social policy. Justice Montgomery did this when
he evaluated the Ponces' claim in light of the existing legal theories of
loss of consortium and the wrongful death statute.59 Neither provided
the Ponces with a protected interest.60 Furthermore, social policy also
prevented the extension of liability to the Ponces under Justice Montgomery's analysis. 6' Hence, Justice Montgomery, utilizing analysis similar
to that suggested in Ramirez, arrived at the same conclusion as did Justice
Baca in Calkins. After looking at legal precedent and existing statutes,
Justice Montgomery searched for other principles that might find a duty
owed to the Ponces. As opposed to Justice Baca, Justice Montgomery
identified and applied what Justice Baca called "other principles" of
law.
D. Ransom in Calkins and Solon: Policy is the Doctrine of
Remoteness
Justice Ransom, writing as the sole dissenter in Calkins, disagreed with
the majority's reading of the duty analysis in Palsgraf.In Calkins, Justice
Ransom first stated his position that duty is not determined exclusively
by foreseeability. The heart of Justice Ransom's dissent was his disagreement with the court's use of foreseeability in duty analysis. Justice
Ransom stated that only in the rare case will foreseeability be exclusively
a question of law; therefore, legal policy should be the controlling factor
in duty analysis. 62 According to Justice Ransom, the "crux of the duty
56. Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 (quoting WILLAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
§§ 53a and 324 (4th ed. 1971)).
57. Id.
58. See Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez, 11 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (991). In
Lovelace, Justice Montgomery, writing the majority opinion, stated that not all injuries are
an invasion of a legally protected interest and that courts must decide what interests should
be protected. Id. at 343, 805 P.2d 610. This decision is governed by what Justice Montgomery,
in Solon, calls social policy. Solon, 113 N.M. at 571, 829 P.2d at 651.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 67, 792 P.2d at 44. Justice Ransom's reading of Palsgraf is
that it represents the rare case when foreseeability is the controlling factor in duty analysis.
His dissent seems to suggest that Judge Cardozo would have gone on to discuss policy if
he had found Mrs. Palsgraf's injuries foreseeable. Id.
TORTS
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analysis turn[ed] not on a factual determination of foreseeability, but
instead, on a legal determination of public policy." ' 63 Hence, he clearly
stated the position that policy, not foreseeability, should be the controlling
factor in determining whether a duty existed.
Justice Ransom's perceptions of the role of policy suggested that public
policy would limit duty, which would in turn preclude a finding of
liability that is too remote." Justice Ransom wrote:
More often, duty as a matter of law turns not on an absence of the
fact issue of foreseeability, but rather the policy issue of whether it
is reasonable to impose a duty to avoid a risk of injury which,
although foreseeable, is remote. 65
In formulating what he calls the "doctrine of remoteness," Justice
Ransom proposed that, when deciding duty as a matter of law, the court
should adopt Justice Andrews' analysis of proximate cause in Palsgraf.
In proposing this, Justice Ransom provided a definition of his policy
analysis. Judge Andrews, writing about proximate cause, stated that
"because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice,
the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point. '" 6 Justice Ransom translated this limitation of causation into a
limitation of duty. As Judge Andrews wrote and Justice Ransom cited,
this is not logic but, instead, "practical politics." 67 Justice Ransom felt
that the court, in determining the presence of a duty, should have used
this principle of "practical politics" as a matter of law instead of
considering proximate cause, which has its own "factual application.""
Hence, Justice Ransom's policy analysis is governed by a rough sense
of justice and an "arbitrary" sense of the appropriate limits of liability
that he applies when determining remoteness.
In Calkins, Justice Ransom suggested twice that, as a "matter of public
policy," 69 it would not have been reasonable to require the landlord to
owe a duty to the child under those specific circumstances. Justice Ransom
acknowledged that, even if the injury was foreseeable, it would have
been too remote to permit liability. 70 He stated that "[u]nder the doctrine
of remoteness, foreseeability is not controlling." ' 71 Justice Ransom's stated
view is that the duty analysis is "a matter of public policy driven by
the doctrine of remoteness." ' 72 Justice Ransom's view was best stated
when he wrote:

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928).
67. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 67, 792 P.2d at 44 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 68, 792 P.2d at 45.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 67, 792 P.2d at 44.
72. Id. at 68, 792 P.2d at 45.
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It may be unreasonable and, therefore, negligent not to avoid a
foreseeable risk of harm unless the risk is remote as a matter of law.
Remoteness, however, is not a fact. It is policy. Failure to maintain
a fence, foreseeability of a risk of harm, and proximate causation
may give rise to genuine issues of fact; but those issues are not
material to a determination of whether there exists in law a duty to
avoid that which may be remote as a matter of public policy. Said
another way,
it is not unreasonable in law to fail to avoid that which
7
is remote.
Justice Ransom dismissed foreseeability as an only rarely controlling
factor. Hence, his reasoning offers the clearest statement of the role of
policy in duty analysis. He clearly stated that duty is governed by social
policy and all but eliminated foreseeability as a prerequisite. Nevertheless,
Justice Ransom did not take the extra step expressly to dispense with
foreseeability altogether.
Justice Ransom did state that "only rarely" would foreseeability be
the appropriate measure of duty. 74 He stated that "more often," the
social policy determination of remoteness would be the governing principle,
but never stated that social policy would always govern duty, nor that
foreseeability should never be a factor. 75 He did explain that "remoteness
and foreseeability are separate and divergent roads by which we approach
the question of duty."' 76 Hence, Justice Ransom believes that policy
analysis, filtered through the doctrine of remoteness, should be the principle means of resolving the question of duty and that only rarely will
foreseeability be a controlling factor. Still, because Justice Ransom does
not state that policy is the only factor in duty analysis, his view leaves
room for argument and refinement.
In Solon, Justice Ransom concurred only to reiterate the view he
expressed in Calkins regarding the duty analysis. 77 In this concurrence,
Justice Ransom critiqued the majority's use of foreseeability. First, he
rejected Justice Montgomery's conclusion that injury to the Ponces was
not a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence. 78 Second, he stated
that the Calkins court "fell into error" when it adopted the principle
that finds a duty wherever foreseeability is present.7 9 According to Justice
Ransom, this standard was an erroneous reading of Palsgrafand should
be left to proximate cause analysis. 80 He argued that, if a foreseeable
plaintiff is found, the court must address the policy consideration of
limiting liability and might find no duty, despite foreseeability, based on
that policy analysis. 8 '

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Solon,
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

67, 792 P.2d at 43.

113 N.M. at 572-73, 829 P.2d at 651-52.
573, 829 P.2d at 652.
572, 829 P.2d at 651.
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Justice Ransom stated that the Ponces' injuries were both foreseeable
and palpable, but that no duty to the Ponces was owed by the defendant., 2
The controlling factor was the policy limitation on such injuries. The
Ponces' claim failed not for lack of foreseeability, but because their
injury was too remote. Hence, taking his concurrence in Solon and dissent
in Calkins together, Justice Ransom's stated opinion is that duty analysis
is primarily controlled by policy analyzed in light of the doctrine of
remoteness and that only in the rare case will foreseeability play a
determinative role. Justice Ransom does not view the remoteness analysis
as solely a limiting factor, assuming foreseeability is present, but instead
as a factor by which a court could find a duty even in the absence of
a finding of foreseeability. Hence, absent a finding of foreseeability,
Justice Ransom contends that a court could create a duty solely through
the application of public policy.
POLICY: AN ATTEMPT AT A DEFINITION
In Solon, Justice Montgomery explains that the case was not a "good
one" for the court to reexamine its position on duty analysis. Hence,
the Solon decision does not provide a clear statement of the appropriate
relationship between foreseeability and the role of policy in duty analysis.
However, the New Mexico trilogy raises four questions that are keys to
the issue: 1) Is the presence or absence of foreseeability the only test
for duty? 2) Assuming foreseeability, can policy analysis nonetheless negate
a finding of duty? 3) If policy analysis can negate duty to foreseeable
victims, what policies are considered and how are they weighed against
the presence of foreseeability? 4) If injury to the plaintiff is not reasonably
foreseeable, can policy alone justify the imposition of a duty? The answers
to these questions provide the framework for the appropriate duty analysis.
1) Is the presence or absence of foreseeability the only test for duty?
The answer to this question is unanimous. None of the justices have
expressed the opinion that foreseeability should be the sole factor in duty
analysis. Each of the four justices who have written on the subject have
stated that policy considerations are a factor in duty analysis. Hence,
an appropriate duty analysis must not use foreseeability as the sole
criterion.
2) Assuming foreseeability, can policy analysis nonetheless negate a
finding of duty? Only one justice has yet resolved this question. In
Ramirez, the injury was both foreseeable and consistent with sound policy.
Justice Federici did not state the relative weight of foreseeability and
3
policy because he did not find the two in conflict.1 Justice Baca, in
Calkins, also found the injury complained of foreseeable and consistent
with existing policy.8 4 For Justice Baca, policy buttresses the foreseeability
analysis, but it is not clear whether policies disfavoring a finding of duty
V.
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would prevail over a finding of foreseeability. 8 5 Justice Montgomery, in
Solon, found the injury complained of unforeseeable and stated that
policy analysis would also lead to a finding of no duty. 6 Only Justice
Ransom, both in Calkins and Solon, clearly took the position that analysis
of policy can and often may negate duty despite the presence of fore-

seeability .87
3) If policy considerations can negate a finding of duty owed to a
foreseeable plaintiff, what policies are considered and how are they
weighed against the presence of foreseeability? Justice Federici's and
Justice Montgomery's definitions of the role of policy in determining the
existence of duty agree. They agree that the social policy in duty analysis
is determined by analysis of the interests that existing law will protect
and recognize. In their opinions, these justices were able to perform their
interest analysis with reference to existing statutory and case law and
were, therefore, not forced to decide what the social policy consideration
would be absent existing law.8 8 Justice Baca defined policy as being
"determined with reference to legal precedent, statutes, and other principles comprising the law." 8 9 The only ambiguity in Justice Baca's position
is what he means by "other principles." 9 Like Justices Federici and
Montgomery, Justice Baca had an existing legal principle to refer to and,
therefore, did not have to explain in detail what "other principles" would
be. 91
Justice Ransom stated his definition of policy as the doctrine of remoteness governed by practical politics and convenience.Y The current
parameters of the policy analysis are, therefore, still fluid. However, the
majority view seems to define policy as determined by the interest that
is recognized by the existing legal framework.
4) If injury to the plaintiff is not reasonably foreseeable, can policy
alone justify imposition of a duty? Because none of the Justices expressly
stated whether duty could exist, even in the absence of foreseeability of
harm, the issue is left open. Justice Montgomery views policy as only
a limiting factor and not something that could create a duty absent
foreseeability. 9 Justice Federici analyzed policy as a factor in duty analysis, only after finding foreseeability. 94 Therefore, he did not state whether
policy alone could create a duty if foreseeability of harm was missing.
Even though Justice Baca did not clearly enunciate a complete definition
of his policy analysis, he did declare that duty was a question of policy. 95
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Hence, in Justice Baca's policy analysis, the presence of a "legal precedent" or "[an) other principle comprising the law" could create a duty
absent foreseeability. 96 Because policy plays such a decisive role in Justice
Ransom's duty analysis, it is likely that it could create a duty absent
foreseeability.9 7 Nevertheless, if policy is to create a duty, the injury
would have to be well within one of the expressed policy standards.
VI.

CONCLUSION

New Mexico's duty analysis began with the Ramirez statement that
foreseeability is the sole factor in determining the existence of duty.
Other language in Ramirez, however, as well as all the opinions in Calkins
and Solon, demonstrate that policy considerations also play a critical
role in duty creation. Unless Justice Ransom's view that foreseeability
is largely irrelevant prevails, future duty cases will have to focus on
identifying the proper factors encompassed within the policy analysis and
the question of the relative weight to be given to foreseeability and policy
when these two criteria point to opposite conclusions.
DAVID J. JARAMILLO
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